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Abstract 
Regional integration occupies a prominent place in the economic policies of most Sub-
Saharan African countries. However, despite different waves of initiatives across the 
African continent, the majority of African regional schemes have not managed to 
achieve their ambitious goal of promoting sustainable development through trade 
integration in Africa. In light of this observation, using the West African cocoa-
chocolate sector as a case study, we propose the regional developmentalism 
paradigm as an alternative approach to regionalism in Africa, placing a particular 
emphasis on the use of regional and sub-regional approaches to development. Instead 
of full-fledged trade liberalisation and indiscriminate economic integration, the regional 
developmentalism paradigm advocates for state-led trade facilitation, regulatory 
convergence and capacity-building through the adoption of policies directed at 
strategic sectors. We evaluate the potential of the regional developmentalism 
paradigm to promote economic transformation and commodity-based industrialisation 
against the shortcomings of the current regional integration approach embodied in the 
institutional framework of ECOWAS. 
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According to the neoliberal paradigm, regional economic integration should strengthen 
a region’s commercial interests and foster trade diversification and creation. Trade 
integration in particular involves the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, 
which is expected to promote the free movement of goods, services and factors of 
production across regional borders and thereby accelerate countries’ economic 
growth and development (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971). Given its expected 
benefits, regional integration has been one of the key policy initiatives across the 
African continent. This is evident in recent efforts to advance regional integration 
through the signing in March 2018 of the Agreement to establish an African 
Continental Free Trade Area, which aims to create a continental market for goods and 
services.1 However, despite multiple waves of regional economic integration initiatives 
over the years, the majority of African regional schemes has not achieved the 
ambitious goal of economic growth via trade creation, nor have regions become more 
economically integrated. 
Existing literature has pinned the failure of African regional schemes to deliver the 
intended results to design flaws. More specifically, it is argued that the European Union 
inspired model of economic integration that has been adopted by most schemes is 
unlikely to be adapted to the specific needs and circumstances of the participating 
economies and is therefore unable to produce the intended results (Draper, 2010). 
Under this EU-inspired model, regional integration is achieved through various stages 
in linear succession, which include (1) preferential and free trade areas in which 
participating countries scale down or completely abolish tariffs and other quantitative 
restrictions on regional trade; (2) a Customs Union which includes both the abolition 
of tariffs among participating countries and the adoption of a common external trade 
policy; and (3) a Common Market which involves the abolition of all barriers to trade 
and the free movement of factors of production (labour and capital); for further details 
see Balassa (1962) and Kyambalesa and Houngnikpo (2006, p.1). More advanced 
forms can also include (4) an Economic Union, with the adoption of common economic 
policies or (5) a Monetary Union, with the adoption of a common currency (ibid).2 
Trade creation and integration is expected to occur as countries gain access to larger 
markets. As cross-border trade provides both new markets for exports and cheaper 
imports, consumer surplus is thought to increase and production gains made 
(Pelkmans, 1986, p.318). However, full-fledged trade liberalisation and free movement 
of goods and services are unlikely to be advantageous for most African economies as 
their exports are not diversified and predominantly of the low value-added kind; see 
 
1 The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was launched at the 10th Extraordinary Session 
of the Assembly of the African Union, held in Kigali, Rwanda on 21 March 2018. 




UNECA (1990, p.19) and also UNCTAD (2000, 2002).3 A vast majority of African 
economies depend on the export of primary commodities and imports of manufactured 
goods leading to deteriorating terms of trade. Industrialisation, where it happened, has 
been slow. The process is hampered by competition from large multinational 
companies (MNCs) which, equipped with better resources and more attractive 
products, increasingly access domestic markets. This situation has adversely affected 
the African countries’ infant industries, which are often unable to cope with the foreign 
competition; see Khor (2008) and UNECA (1989, p.19). Hence, rather than promoting 
structural transformation and economic growth,4 trade liberalisation has often 
increased regions’ dependence on primary commodity exports, as countries have 
been unable to promote the growth of their domestic industries. 
Consequently, the reduction of barriers to trade has failed to promote sustained 
economic growth in the past and primary commodity exporting countries continue to 
grapple with declining terms of trade and notoriously volatile commodity prices which 
make an effective management of their macro economy almost impossible (Paul, 
2003, p.30).5 This reality has been exacerbated by the current COVID-19 pandemic, 
which has further exposed Africa’s over-reliance on its commodity trade with the rest 
of the world, which raises fears of catastrophic consequences of this situation on most 
African economies. 
Acknowledging the argument of design flaws in existing regional integration schemes, 
this paper goes further and argues that the concept of regional integration in itself is 
inappropriately framed to achieve the objectives associated with it in the context of 
most African economies. Our contribution is twofold: First, we demonstrate that the 
perceived automatism between the abolition of tariffs and regional integration is 
illusionary, establishing the de jure - de facto fallacy, and highlighting the need for a 
political economy approach to understand why an effective regional integration has 
not taken place in many African regional schemes. Second, on the basis of our 
analysis we propose an alternative concept to regional integration that is more suitable 
for economies where the need for structural transformation is prevalent and 
comparative advantages need to be created through strategic regional governance. 
Our alternative approach is based on the concept of regional developmentalism.6 The 
regional developmentalism approach is inspired by the new developmental state 
 
3 It is argued in UNECA (1990) that, although trade liberalisation might result in a significant 
increase of exports, it might not constitute the most appropriate measure to help developing 
countries diversify their exports and shift their production system out of primary commodities and 
thereby promoting sustained economic growth. The report argues for trade policies that take into 
account local circumstances and maximise a sustained domestic growth, including policies that 
might not involve the reduction of trade barriers. 
4 Structural transformation refers to productivity-enhancing structural change as defined in Nissanke 
(2019). 
5 Although it was recently argued by Kaplinsky (2006) that the trend has been reversed with 
increasing demand from China and India. 
6 This paradigm has been developed in Bashi Rudahindwa (2018). It is inspired by the discussions 




paradigm and argues for a strong emphasis on socio-economic development as the 
very reason for the existence of regional trade arrangements and regional 
communities. Instead of full-fledged trade liberalisation and indiscriminate economic 
integration, the regional developmentalism paradigm advocates for state-led trade 
facilitation, inward investments and productive capacity development in an attempt to 
reverse the adverse effects that the international economic order has on lower- and 
middle-income countries. According to this approach, regional integration schemes 
that do not achieve this goal should be either dissolved or transformed, to prevent 
them from becoming an impediment to the economies of the participating countries.7 
Regional developmentalism therefore argues for the adoption of regional and sub-
regional approaches to development,8 as well as for a set of new policies that 
emphasise dynamic economic and corporate governance. The approach emphasises 
the need to take into account not only the domestic and regional context but the global 
political economy context within which regions operate and the constraints therein to 
design effective policies that achieve economic transformation. This strategy is 
suggested to provide for a new and more suitable conceptual paradigm to incite 
sustainable development across the African continent; see the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development Framework Document, NEPAD (2001, article 27), and also 
Kouam (2008, p.113-126) and Aka (2012, p.56). 
It is in this context that sectoral integration is presented as a viable first step before or 
even instead of full-fledged trade liberalisation. Sectoral integration could take into 
consideration the particular circumstances of the countries participating in regional 
schemes by targeting key economic sectors which are more likely to help promote 
industrialisation, export diversification and sustained economic growth through spill-
overs and the creation of regional value chains. This strategy is likely to allow countries 
to proceed to a gradual liberalisation if desired, while taking time to strengthen their 
infant industries’ competitiveness. 
The spirit of this approach is already embraced by recent initiatives launched within 
the African Union, including the Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade Initiative 
(BIAT) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) which, 
beyond a simple promotion of cross-border trade and the increase in regional 
exchanges, puts a particular emphasis on measures designed to strengthen the 
productive capacity of African states.9 With the same idea, the West African Common 
 
regionalism” in that it places greater emphasis on identifying the harmful effects of the international 
economic order on developing countries, as well as on the various measures to be adopted to 
overcome them. Developmental regionalism is discussed in UNCTAD (2013) or in Ismail (2020). 
7 E.g., East African Community, which was established in 1967 but dissolved in 1977 because of 
structural problems, before being re-established in July 2000. 
8 This strategy is intended to address the shortcomings of previous regional approaches which 
tended to promote a set of policies designed to support economic growth regardless of Sub-Saharan 
African countries’ particular circumstances. The new strategy is therefore aimed at providing an 
approach that corresponds to the needs of specific countries and regions. 
9 For further details on the BIAT and PIDA, see https://au.int/en/ti/biat/about and 




Industrial Policy (WACIP) was adopted by the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in 2010 to boost the industrialisation of the region through regional 
infrastructure development and the promotion of value-added transformation of raw 
materials. 
The analysis conducted in this paper focuses on ECOWAS, which has adopted an 
EU-inspired linear approach to regional economic integration in which both regulatory 
and institutional frameworks (de jure integration) have been improved over the years 
to advance the integration process and establish an Economic Union. ECOWAS, 
however, also provides the example of an African Regional Economic Community 
(REC) in which efforts towards an effective formal regional economic integration (de 
facto integration) have been relatively slow. We illustrate the de jure - de facto fallacy 
of the regional integration approach on the example of the cocoa-chocolate sector 
which is considered one of the region’s strategic sectors and use the sector case study 
to explore the feasibility of the regional developmentalism approach. In light of the 
findings of our analysis, the paper firstly reiterates the argument that the current 
paradigm of economic integration followed by the region is not apt to the needs of the 
participating countries and secondly outlines how the concept of regional 
developmentalism could present a viable alternative. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, the second section 
consists of an overview of the progress made by ECOWAS since its establishment to 
its regulatory and institutional frameworks (de jure integration). The third section 
highlights the de jure - de facto fallacy on the example of the West African cocoa-
chocolate sector and provides an analysis on the causes and consequences of this 
fallacy. The fourth section makes a case for regional developmentalism to tackle the 
causes identified in section three. In light of this analysis, the concluding remarks in 
the fifth section are used to summarise the various arguments developed throughout 
the paper and to consider the potential benefits that a sectoral integration could bring 
to the region. 
 
2. De Jure Integration: The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
 
ECOWAS was founded in 1975 as a regional group to promote integration across the 
region. It consists of the 15 West African countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.10  ECOWAS countries, apart from Cape Verde, are 
split into two currency and customs unions: the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest 
Africaine - UEMOA (in English: West African Economic and Monetary Union) 
comprises eight ECOWAS member states – Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau – which share the CFA Franc as a common 
 
10 Although originally a member, Mauritania left ECOWAS in 2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union 




currency. The declared aim of the union is the creation of a common market and the 
adoption of harmonised fiscal policies. Further, ECOWAS and UEMOA have 
developed a common plan on trade liberalisation including common rules of origin. 
The West African Monetary Zone - WAMZ, comprises six ECOWAS countries – 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia – with the declared aim 
to introduce a common currency (ECO). In contrast to UEMOA, WAMZ is not a 
customs union. 
 
Figure 1: ECOWAS 
 
ECOWAS was established with the ultimate goal of fostering economic and social 
development in its Member States, a goal which was to be achieved through an 
‘effective cooperation largely through a determined and concerted policy of self-
reliance’.11 During this first phase, the integration process focused primarily on several 
key sectors, including industry, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial issues and social and cultural matters. 
This initial approach to regionalism was adopted to accommodate the Member States’ 
concerns over their sovereignty and independence and was expected to promote and 
develop the region’s local businesses as well as to promote intra-regional trade, 
allowing the Member States to increase their self-reliance and reverse a cycle of 
significant external dependence which was a direct consequence of the institutional 
framework inherited from colonialism, which was designed to meet the needs of the 
former colonial powers for raw materials. 
 




The provisions of the Treaty constituted the fundamental and primary source of law in 
the Community and were supposed to be implemented through secondary legislation 
to be issued by two main institutions, the Authority of Heads of States and Government 
and the Council of Ministers, in order to achieve the goals of the Community.12 The 
harmonisation of policies was also recognised as a mechanism necessary for the 
effective functioning of the Community.13 The Treaty provided for harmonisation of 
policies in key areas to promote regional development, including harmonisation of 
industrial incentives, industrial development plans and economic policies (ECOWAS, 
1975, article 30). Other areas which were expected to be covered by the 
harmonisation process included the free movements of goods, services, persons and 
capital, aimed at creating a legal environment broadly the same in all Member States 
in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty provisions (Ovrawah, 1994). 
Further, a Trade Liberalisation Scheme (TLS) was adopted and aimed at the total 
removal of tariffs on all unprocessed goods and handicrafts as well as the progressive 
elimination of tariffs on all industrial products from 1981 to 1989 (Omorogbe, 1992). 
With the view to furthering the integration process in the region and to ensure the 
success of the Community in achieving its goal, the ECOWAS Member States initiated 
a series of revisions of the Lagos Treaty, which culminated with the adoption of a new 
Treaty in Cotonou, Benin in July 1993. Through the 1993 ECOWAS Treaty, the 
Member States recommitted themselves to economic integration by proceeding to the 
relevant amendments to the 1975 Treaty and by attempting to set definite timetables 
for progress to the next stages of the integration process14. These amendments aimed 
inter alia at strengthening the binding nature of the legal instruments of the community 
(Authority’s decisions and Council’s regulations) upon the ECOWAS Member States 
(ECOWAS, 1993, articles 9(4) and 12(3))15 and the improvement of the Community 
law-making process (ECOWAS, 1993, articles 9(2) and 12(2)). 
In parallel to the strengthening of the Community’s regulatory framework, the 1993 
Treaty provided for the establishment of new institutions which were supposed to 
increase popular participation in the Community decision-making process, hence 
ensuring that these decisions truly reflected the aspirations of the people. Although 
the Authority and the Council remained generally unchanged, the Secretariat was 
strengthened and a Community Parliament, an Economic and Social Council and a 
Court of Justice were introduced (ECOWAS, 1993, article 6). In particular, the 
Community Court of Justice (CCJ) was given a wider mandate compared to the 
 
12 The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, article 5 (3) provided for the decisions and directions of the Authority 
whereas article 6 (3) provided for the ones by the Council. 
13 The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, article 2 (g) provides for “the harmonisation of the economic and 
industrial policies of the Member States and the elimination of disparities in the level of development 
of the Member States.” 
14 1993 ECOWAS Treaty, article 3 (2) provides for clear stages supposed to lead the Community 
towards the establishment of a Common Market. Moreover, articles 35 and 54 provide for fixed 
deadlines for the establishment of a Customs Union (within 10 years from 1 January 1990) and a 
Monetary Union 5 years after the customs union. 
15 The instruments adopted by the Council were renamed “regulations” in order to distinguish them 




Tribunal under the 1975 Treaty, and the Economic and Social Council was aimed at 
conveying the needs and concerns of local businesses to the Community. This 
initiative strengthened the role of the Court in the dispute resolution mechanism, 
helping it to play a more significant role in the integration process of the region by 
compelling both the Member States and the Community institutions to apply the Treaty 
provisions in a uniform manner. 
The last revision of the ECOWAS’s legal framework occurred in 2006, with the 
transformation of the Executive Secretariat into the ECOWAS Commission, to allow it 
to be more effective in order to further the integration process; see Kufuor (2006) and 
Gathii (2011, p.155). The restructuring provided the Commission with a president, a 
vice-president and different commissioners in charge of several departments working 
on specific areas to be developed through regional cooperation16.  Alongside the 
transformation of the Commission, a Common External Tariff (CET) was adopted by 
the Authority of Heads of State and Government, to ensure the transformation of the 
Community into a Customs Union. 
With a view to addressing the region’s continuing dependence on primary commodity 
exports, ECOWAS adopted two regional legal instruments, namely the ECOWAS 
Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP) in 2005 and the West African Common Industrial Policy 
(WACIP) in 2010. ECOWAP, which is intended to apply the Comprehensive Africa 
Agricultural Programme developed through NEPAD17,  provides for a Regional 
Agricultural Investment Plan (RAIP), which is aimed at giving general principles to be 
applied in each Member State through various National Agricultural Investment Plans 
(NAIPs) (ECOWAS, 2005, p.6). The general principles outlined under ECOWAP 
include food security, fair remuneration of farmers and agricultural wage labour, 
expansion of trade and value addition and a common regulatory framework 
(ECOWAS, 2008). WACIP, on the other hand, is aimed at accelerating the 
industrialisation of the region through the endogenous transformation of locally 
produced raw materials and the development of regional infrastructure (ECOWAS, 
2010, p.2). 
Although the intentions behind the adoption of ECOWAP and WACIP are aligned with 
the spirit of the regional developmentalism paradigm, these lack efficacy in their 
current form. While efforts to materialise the Member States’ planned interventions 
under ECOWAP have been slow and been undermined by multiple financial 
constraints (Crola, 2015), WACIP has not provided for an adequate mechanism for 
the application of its policies at the national level. Moreover, WACIP does not provide 
for appropriate incentives aimed at reversing the current production structure (OSIWA, 
2015). 
 
16 These departments include Administration and Finance; Agriculture, Environment and Water Re- 
sources; Human Development and Gender; Infrastructure; Macro-economic Policy; Political Affairs, 
Peace and Security; Trade, Customs, Industry and Free Movement. 





In light of the above account of the institutional and regulatory evolution of ECOWAS, 
we will move to analyse the shortcomings of the existing regional integration approach 
on the example of the West-Africa cocoa-chocolate sector, identifying the absence of 
regional integration despite the sector’s strategic importance and demonstrating the 
benefits of an alternative conceptual approach and the corresponding regulatory 
strategy, specifically designed to promote both sectoral integration and commodity-
based industrialisation and, thereby, a more effective regional development through 
structural transformation. 
 
3. De Jure - De Facto Fallacy 
 
Despite the gradual improvement of both its regulatory and institutional frameworks 
(de jure integration), deeper economic integration within the ECOWAS region has not 
materialised; see Figure 2. Trade within the region has actually become relatively less 
important since the establishment of the Free Trade Area in 2000; see ECOWAS 
(2007, p.2) and UNECA (2013b). Although trade volumes grew steadily, the growth in 
intraregional trade fails to match the rise in exports and imports to and from the EU, 
US and increasingly also the so-called BRICS economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa. Tendencies towards trade diversification into higher value-added 
segments of supply chains are also largely absent. The region continues to be heavily 
dependent on primary commodity exports,18 as painfully demonstrated by the 
comovement of export income and commodity prices while expenditures on imports 
are largely unaffected by the price cycles.19 It is easy to see from the bottom half of 
Figure 2, how the latest commodity price slump had devastating consequences for the 
balance of payment position of the ECOWAS region. The region’s continuous reliance 
on primary commodity exports hampers its efforts towards economic transformation, 
production diversification and sustainable economic development (ECOWAS, 2007, 
p.3). 
Part of this lack of economic integration is explained by the fact that most ECOWAS 
Member States are yet to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to intra-regional trade 
and thereby implement a fully functioning Customs Union (UNCTAD, 2018; ITC, 
2016). However, we argue that the observed failure to remove tariff and non-tariff 
barriers and the lack of progress towards increasing regional economic integration is 
no unintended consequence of slowly adjusting institutional structures but a direct 
result of the imposition of a misguided paradigm of regional integration. 
 
18 All ECOWAS Member States were listed as commodity export dependent in the UNCTAD (2019) 
report on the state of commodity dependence. Most ECOWAS member states’ exports contain more 
than 80 per cent primary commodities. 
19 The exception here are imports of refined oil from the United Arab Emirates which are accounted 





Figure 2: ECOWAS Trading Partners, per cent of annual trade volume in USD and annual 
trade volume in Billion USD. Source: Comtrade for trade volume. UNCTAD for commodity 
price index (2015 = 100, all groups). 
 
It is against this observed failure of the current paradigm that we highlight the need for 
the adoption of an alternative conceptual approach and corresponding regulatory 
strategy, both specifically designed to promote sectoral integration and commodity-
based industrialisation and, thereby, a more effective regional development facilitated 
by economic structural transformation. 
Taking the West African cocoa-chocolate sector as a case study, we outline the failure 
of the existing regional integration paradigm to effectively address key bottlenecks that 
prevent large scale upgrading into higher value addition and commodity-based 
industrialisation via regional markets. The cocoa-chocolate sector has been identified 




identified under WACIP for the development of regional industrial plans to raise local 
processing before export (Traore, 2016). 
 
3.1 The West African Cocoa-Chocolate Sector 
 
As many agri-food chains, the global cocoa-chocolate chain is shaped by a high 
concentration of buyer power in the hands of a few MNCs (Gereffi, 1994; Cramer, 
1999; Gibbon, 2001; Talbot, 2009), which makes it difficult for newcomers, which yet 
lack the necessary infrastructure, skills, and size, to enter. Two lead segments 
dominate the global cocoa-chocolate supply chain: grinders, who process cocoa 
beans into intermediate products and branders, who manufacture consumable end-
products and merchandise them (Fold, 2001, 2002). Large supermarket chains have 
been suggested as an additional lead segment as they increasingly appropriate a 
share in value addition by supporting their own brands (Fold, 2008; Fold and Larsen, 
2011; UNECA, 2013a). These lead segments are highly concentrated with a handful 
of MNCs holding more than 50 per cent of the global market share (TCC, 2010; Gilbert, 
2007). In addition to the market power of incumbent MNCs, national and international 
standards for cocoa beans and cocoa containing foodstuff are highly complex and for 
many countries, tariffs increase progressively with the degree of cocoa processing, 
posing an effective barrier to entry.20 
In this context, it has repeatedly been argued that the most promising route for new 
entrants into a global value chain is via regional markets (UNECA, 2013a; Nissanke, 
2019; Lee et al., 2017). Regional markets can provide necessary linkages and 
technological spill-overs for the infant industries to develop, whereby local firms are 
able to build up capabilities in regional markets which are less demanding in terms of 
standards and competition (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). This rationale is at the 
heart of the revised treaty of 1993 and 2006 which firmly commits to promoting value 
addition at origin. In addition, the latest COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated the fragility 
of globally dispersed supply networks and reinvigorated an interest in regional 
networks. However, despite West Africa being the single largest region to contribute 
to world cocoa bean supply (75 per cent of the world’s cocoa is produced in West 
Africa driven mainly by Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana and with much lower volume also 
Nigeria), only 2 per cent of the $100 billion cocoa industry is generated in the region 
and cocoa beans are largely exported with no or little processing for value addition 
(TAFAC, 2019). 
Paradoxically, West Africa and the African continent in general are among the fastest 
growing markets for consumer chocolate and cocoa containing food stuff, whereby the 
rising demand is satisfied in great parts through imports from outside the region (89 
per cent of chocolate imports originate from outside the region); see Figure 3. Europe 
 
20 E.g., for European countries these are set by the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1881/2006 which 




and the Americas (including the US) remain the largest cocoa consuming regions, 
however growth rates have been low, hovering around 1 per cent annual growth since 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and subsequent recession of 2007/08. Over the 
same time, growth rates in Africa reached 7 per cent and only declined with the 
collapse of commodity prices in 2016.  
 
Figure 3: Cocoa Consumption Comparison by World Region and Chocolate and Other Food 
Preparations Containing Cocoa Imports by ECOWAS by Trade Partner. Source: ICCO, 
Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics. UN Comtrade Database. 
 
The two major cocoa producers, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have the highest per capita 
cocoa consumption, while per capita consumption in Nigeria, the largest of the 
ECOWAS economies, is below the African average despite its proximity to the cocoa 
producing centres and being a cocoa producer herself. As evident from the growth 
figures, chocolate and cocoa containing food stuff are luxury food goods. Demand is 




the African chocolate market is still small compared to other world regions, the high 
growth rates experienced over the last decade driven by a rising middle class might 
turn the region into an attractive investment destination for the confectionary industry. 
Value addition in the cocoa-chocolate sector is achieved through grinding. Grinding is 
the process in which the cocoa nibs’ (inner bean part after roasting) cell structure is 
broken up so that the cocoa butter is released. At this processing stage one obtains 
cocoa liquor. In a second stage the liquor can be pressed to obtain cocoa butter and 
cocoa cake at equal share. Butter is an essential ingredient in chocolate, while powder, 
won from the cocoa cake, is used for drinking chocolate, cookies and other 
confectionery products. Value addition at origin through grinding has increased 
considerably in the region, predominantly through the addition of processing capacity 
in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, the two main cocoa bean producers. As a result, the 
African continent increased its share by more than 8 percentage points between 2000 
and 2016. However, despite the capacity increase, the continent still has the lowest 
local processing capacity relative to its bean production and the export of raw beans 
remains by far the dominant driver of export earnings; see Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Cocoa Bean Production and Grinding per West African Country and 
Region 
Cocoa Bean Grinding of % Share % Share % Share Grinding 
Production† Cocoa Beans† World World in National 
     Production Grinding Production 
2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 2000 2016 
Cˆote d’Ivoire 1,403.60 2,019.60 235.00 577.00 45.62 42.62 7.94 13.13 16.74 28.57 
Ghana 436.90 970.00 70.00 250.40 14.20 20.47 2.37 5.70 16.02 25.81 
Nigeria 165.00 245.00 22.00 30.00 5.36 5.17 0.74 0.68 13.33 12.24 
Europe   1,335.30 1,627.50   45.14 37.02   
USA   447.60 390.00   15.13 8.87   
Africa 2,155.60 3,622.90 367.50 900.50 70.06 76.45 12.42 20.49 17.05 24.86 
Americas∗ 388.90 759.20 404.00 489.60 12.64 16.02 13.66 11.14 103.88 64.49 
Asia&Oceania 532.50 356.70 404.10 988.00 17.31 7.53 13.66 22.48 75.89 276.98 
World 3,077.00 4,738.80 2,958.40 4,395.70       
Notes: ∗without USA; †in thousand tonnes; figures for 2016 are 2016/17 ICCO estimates. 
Source: ICCO, Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics. 
 
Two patterns emerge when looking more closely into the level of value addition 
achieved at origin. Firstly, most processing is at the lower level of value addition 
(Figure 4) and secondly, these lower-level value-added intermediate products are 
exported predominantly to Europe, while trade within the region in these product 
categories remains low (Figure 5). The overall share of value addition in exports is 




of processing. Only Côte d’Ivoire exports in the high value-added segment of 
consumer chocolate which is shipped exclusively to France. This pattern is 
symptomatic of Côte d’Ivoire’s strong remaining ties with the former colonial ruler. 
Cémoi, a French chocolate manufacturer is behind the chocolate production at origin. 
Some of the chocolate is sold domestically through the French retail giant Carrefour 
which has recently established a presence in Côte d’Ivoire, while the remaining 
chocolate is exported to the parent company in France (Cahuzac, 2016). Ghana 
produces consumer chocolate too, but production is in the hands of domestically 
owned companies and (official) export volumes were too small in 2016/17 to show in 
Figure 4.     
 
Figure 4: Value Addition in Export 2016/17. Note: Percentage estimated from tonnes of 
exports. This underestimates some of the value addition that is for the domestic market. 
Source: ICCO, Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, various volumes. 
 
While trading in the lower value-added segments is dominated by exports to Europe, 
export and import partners in the higher value-added cocoa powder and chocolate 
segment are more diverse, with some volume being attributable to intra-regional trade. 
Figure 5 depicts trade volume over a 5-year period to overcome the problem of erratic 
data on intra-regional trade. According to Figure 5, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are 
regional suppliers of cocoa powder, and Ghana is a regional supplier of consumer 
chocolate. Despite low and volatile trading volumes, almost 20 per cent of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s chocolate imports between 2010-15 originate from Ghana and 15 and 25 per 
cent of Nigeria’s and Ghana’s cocoa powder imports respectively originate from Côte 
d’Ivoire. Senegal re-exports chocolate imported from Turkey to its neighbouring 
countries within ECOWAS. Albeit small in scale, regional trade contributes significantly 




hypothesis that regional markets can promote functional upgrading into higher value-
added segments of the cocoa-chocolate chain.21 
 
Figure 5: Percentage Share of Trading Partner in Total Exports (left) and Imports (right). 
Notes: Shares estimated from total trade between 2010-15 in tonnes. Categories with less 
than 200,000 tonnes of trading combined over the 5-year period have been excluded. 
Source: UN Comtrade. 
 
One should note that Figure 5 does not account for smuggling of cocoa beans across 
borders between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. Both countries have different price setting 
mechanisms resulting in potentially huge arbitrage opportunities and up to 100,000 
tonnes, about 10 per cent of total annual harvest per country can change borders in a 
single crop year. The two countries have recently started coordinating farmgate prices 
more closely, which was made possible by the introduction of the Conseil du Café 
Cacao (CCC) in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, reversing decades of liberalisation in the sector 
(Bymolt et al., 2018). In a most recent act of collaboration, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
joint forces in 2019, demanding a $2,600 per tonne minimum price for the 2020/21 
cocoa season to ensure a living income for farmers (Reuters, 2019). However, the 
initiative, albeit originally successful, has been threatened by the latest COVID-19 





21 Similar observations hold for other value-added consumer products consumed in the region for 
which regional trade is significant (ITC, 2016). However, overall, the region remains primary 




3.2 Anatomy of a Failed Regional Integration Paradigm 
 
Despite the potential of a regional market to promote value addition at origin, value 
addition in the West African cocoa-chocolate sector remains low and where it occurs 
in larger volume (e.g., chocolate production in Côte d’Ivoire), seems to be 
disconnected from the opportunities regional markets have to offer. These 
observations outlined in the previous section raise the question what the hindering 
factors to value addition through regional markets are. Three factors might explain the 
current situation. Firstly, the governance structure of the global cocoa-chocolate value 
chain with lead firms preventing newcomers from entering traditional consumer 
markers and claiming new and fast-growing markets for themselves. Secondly, the 
absence of a sector specific regional industrial plan which takes into consideration the 
interest of all ECOWAS member states as well as common and idiosyncratic 
constraints. Thirdly, the region’ heavy reliance on foreign reserve earnings for 
macroeconomic management. 
Except for Cémoi in Côte d’Ivoire which sells its products exclusively via the 
supermarket chain Carrefour, the development of a domestic or regional cocoa-
chocolate industry has been carried by domestic owned processors and 
manufacturers which operate, with few exceptions, on a smaller scale than their MNC 
counterparts. The partly state-owned Ghanaian Cocoa Processing Company has long 
been producing consumer chocolate under the Goldentree brand for the domestic 
market and recently increased its product portfolio as well as volume of production. In 
2011 Niche entered the Ghanaian market for consumer chocolate. While its main 
business is focused on semi processed cocoa for export, some of the cocoa is 
processed into chocolate for the domestic and regional market. Some small-scale 
artisan chocolate producers have also recently emerged such as Instant Chocolat in 
Côte d’Ivoire, 57 Chocolate and Midunu Chocolates in Ghana, and Loshes Chocolate 
in Nigeria. These observations leave us with the conclusion that functional upgrading 
through regional markets by domestic companies is possible. 
However, despite these existing capabilities in the production of consumer chocolate, 
production remains small scale and unable to satisfy even domestic demand as 
evident from Figure 5. This is despite the sector’s potential for expansion regionally as 
well as overseas. South Asia and Southeast Asia, for instance, are potential markets 
given the ability of some of the regionally produced chocolate to withstand relatively 
high temperatures making it possible to be sold by street vendors; a competitive 
advantage for many Asian and African markets.22 Certainly, supply side bottlenecks 
as for instance the lack of key input factors such as sugar, unreliable electricity 
provision, low access to roads and high transport costs, and an underdeveloped 
banking system make consumer chocolate produced in the region comparatively 
 
22 Hershey registered a patent for chocolate that can withstand high temperatures in 2014. Such 
receipt is crucial to expand into many consumer markets in Asia and Africa where snacks like 




expensive. However, we will argue that the main hindering factors to the expansion of 
a regional cocoa-chocolate sector are unrelated to the often-cited supply side 
bottlenecks and instead are a direct consequence of inequalities in global economic 
power structures rather than regional market imperfections. 
A sizable share of the addition to West Africa’s cocoa processing capacity over the 
last decade has been driven by foreign direct investment (FDI). Governments across 
the region have made efforts to provide incentives for FDI inflow, for instance, by 
introducing economic free zones which provide tax exemptions for export-oriented 
businesses and discounts on domestically sourced cocoa beans (e.g., Ghana)23 or by 
issuance of export expansion grants (e.g., Nigeria) (UNECA, 2013a). The produce of 
these foreign owned processing plants is mainly of the low value-added kind (except 
for Cémoi in Côte d’Ivoire) and exclusively reserved for exports to parent companies 
for further processing. The fact that incentive structures are tied to value addition for 
exports (not the domestic or regional market) is an immediate response to the region’s 
disadvantaged position in the international monetary system and globalised finance 
that cements its high dependence on ‘hard’ currency for foreign reserve accumulation 
(Nissanke, 2019). 
The ECOWAS countries maintain different exchange rate regimes. However, 
regardless of the particular regime, large amounts of foreign reserves are required for 
macroeconomic management. The currency of the WAEMU, the CFA franc (now 
ECO), is pegged against the Euro. Until recently, in order to maintain the currency 
peg, the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) deposited a minimum of 
50 per cent of its foreign reserves with the French Treasure and France in turn 
guaranteed full convertibility between the CFA franc and the Euro. The arrangement 
was a relic of the region’s colonial past and has been repeatedly criticised for 
constraining monetary policy and imposing high opportunity costs by depositing 
foreign reserves with the French Treasure. Also, with the BRICS economies growing 
in importance as trading partners, a peg against a single currency is increasingly 
inadequate. In recent years, sufficient reserves to maintain the peg could only be 
reached by issuance of Eurobonds by Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, adding to the 
region’s foreign denominated public debt level. Other currencies, e.g. the Ghanaian 
Cedi or the Nigerian Naira, do not follow a peg resulting in these being highly 
susceptible to commodity price fluctuations (e.g. the recent collapse of oil prices has 
weakened the Naira considerably) and central banks are required to intervene by use 
of foreign reserves in order to defend the currency if necessary. 
Cocoa-based exports contributed about 20 and 40 per cent of Ghana’s and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s export earnings respectively in 2015/16. Policies such as the establishment 
of special economic zones or provision of export expansion grants are aimed at value 
addition for export outside the region not for the domestic or regional market. The main 
intention of these policies is the acquisition of foreign exchange. For instance, Niche 
 
23 Since 2000, nine processing companies have been established in Ghana alone, of which six are 




in Ghana acts mainly as a processing company for intermediate products to satisfy the 
70 per cent of production for export threshold to qualify for tax reductions. Domestically 
owned processing companies are required, like their foreign owned counterparts, to 
purchase cocoa beans with US dollars to ensure foreign reserve earnings are made 
on the full harvest. As domestic companies lack access to cheap US dollar funding, it 
is unsurprising that most processing companies which work on a high volume are 
foreign owned. Foreign owned companies, mainly MNCs, have not yet moved into 
exploiting the fast-growing consumer markets of West Africa. The MNCs’ business 
model relies firmly on retailers to reach consumer markets. However, as retail giants 
are expanding into the West African consumer markets,24 more MNCs might engage 
in domestic chocolate production soon. It is this combination of the need of regional 
governments for foreign reserves and the disinterest (for now) of MNCs for higher 
value addition at origin, that results in West African cocoa producing countries to 
remain locked into the lower value-added segment. Full-fledged regional trade 
liberalisation does not challenge either of these two conditions. 
Within the ECOWAS region, Nigeria is the most important consumer market to tap 
into. As the largest and most populated economy of the region, Nigeria could provide 
a fertile ground for a regional cocoa-chocolate sector to develop, overcoming the 
limitation of relatively small domestic markets (Nissanke, 2019). However, Nigeria is 
also a cocoa producing nation; see Table 1. Although the volume of production is 
considerably lower than for Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria has intentions to revive 
its cocoa sector as well as expand cocoa processing capacity for the domestic 
consumer market and Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are viewed as competitors rather than 
allies in the establishment of a regional cocoa-chocolate sector (PwC, 2017). 
However, considering that the major share of imported chocolate originates from 
outside the region according to Figure 5, this concern is unfounded. 
A sectoral approach to regional integration must hence take the position of the region 
within the global economy and globalised finance as well as the interests of incumbent 
market leaders and the interests of all member states within the region into account. 
This includes the acknowledgment that the removal of tariff or non-tariff barriers will 
do little to address existing challenges. Quite contrary it might actually promote the 
import of consumer chocolate from outside the region as evident from chocolate 
imported from Turkey, Malaysia and Europe into the ECOWAS region; see Figure 5. 
The establishment of a regional currency, the ECO, could potentially address the 
dependence of the region on foreign revere earnings (i.e., US dollar and EURO) as 
discussed in the next section, while interests of individual member states could be 
aligned by a carefully negotiated and crafted industrial plan. 
 
 
24 The so-called supermarket revolution has seen traditional retail giants as well as newcomers 





4. Sectoral Integration and Regional Cooperation: Towards a New Paradigm 
 
De facto regional integration in the cocoa-chocolate sector is currently limited in West 
Africa and hampered by remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, partly driven 
by conflicting interests of the main cocoa producing countries and fear of competition 
from neighbouring countries. Given the growing inflow of consumer chocolate and 
cocoa containing food stuff from outside, this concern is misguided, and concerted 
efforts should be made towards more regional cooperation to build, develop and 
strengthen a regional production network. Regulatory instruments under ECOWAS, 
namely the ECOWAP and WACIP, could potentially facilitate further cooperation if 
provided with sufficient resources. An appropriate WACIP, for example, ought to 
identify key industrial sectors in a coordinated effort with ECOWAP, such as the cocoa-
chocolate sector, which could have the potential to promote economic growth in the 
ECOWAS region and ensure that both foreign and regional investments are harnessed 
to promote a commodity-based industrialisation. However, the ECOWAS institutional 
setup is yet insufficient and suffers from funding constraints and coordination failure. 
These challenges call for a carefully coordinated approach to sectoral integration, 
which could be best led by the two state-owned marketing boards in Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire in collaboration with the Ministries of Finance of the ECOWAS member states 
including Nigeria as another cocoa producer in the region and the ECOWAS 
Department of Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources (DAEWR). The 
sectoral approach cannot be limited to cocoa alone but must take a holistic GVC view 
at the cocoa-chocolate sector including the sourcing of relevant input factors, ranging 
from fertiliser to sugar, dairy and packaging, all currently sourced from outside the 
ECOWAS region. These forward and backward linkages have to be carefully forged 
and promoted.25 
Such a holistic sectoral approach that brings together and aligns the interests of 
different industry and policy stakeholders could potentially address existing 
bottlenecks, help in sourcing key input factors and thereby align interests of the 
different member states. The dairy sector in Niger and Nigeria is promising while 
Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria produce sugar cane of relevant volume. The 
promotion of investments in industries such as dairy, sugar and packaging, combined 
with an effective reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers targeting these sectors, would 
make it possible to develop regional value chains more quickly. 
Given these supply side bottlenecks and foreign reserve constraints, a clearly 
designed and skilfully coordinated industrial policy for the West African cocoa-
chocolate sector is essential for the sector to expand. A Cocoa Regional Industrial 
Policy (RIP), which aligns with the proposed paradigm based on regional 
developmentalism, has already been suggested as an appropriate regulatory solution 
 
25 The argument here is aligned with points made by Hauge (2020) and Behuria (2020) who argue 
about the importance of combining the GVC perspective with a developmentalist industrial policy 




(Traore, 2016). The region’s growing demand for chocolate and cocoa containing 
foods provides a fertile ground for a regional industry to develop. Regional capabilities 
in chocolate production already exist. Once matured, the industry could tap into 
potential consumer markets overseas and across the continent. The Cocoa RIP can 
be used to improve the business environment for cocoa-chocolate production, 
including through a concerted and strategic effort to establish more special economic 
zones (SEZ) across the region. These SEZ would give infant industries the opportunity 
to develop their competitiveness, while building and strengthening regional value 
chains. A further step would be to support increased access to financial and technical 
resources in the sector across the region, and also help channel more investment in 
related sectors. 
These initiatives should be combined with infant industry protection measures, 
including tariffs, import quotas and subsidised government loans. These measures, 
which are used to promote import substitution industrialisation (ISI), could be 
accommodated under the WTO Enabling Clause, which is designed to benefit regional 
trade agreements involving less developed countries, as well as GATT 94 article XVIII, 
which includes special measures for the protections and the nurturing of infant 
industries in poor developing countries; see the discussion on safeguard measures 
and GATT 94 article XVIII in Bashi Rudahindwa (2018, p.47). These ISI measures 
would be temporary, allowing the region to promote a full liberalisation once a higher 
level of industrialisation has been achieved (Adewale, 2017). 
For the Cocoa RIP to be successful, infrastructure investment must be an integral part 
of the Cocoa RIP design to address the high demand in transport infrastructure, with 
the creation or the strengthening of various trade routes across the region, to promote 
physical integration which is critical in the development of regional value chains. To 
address the institutional gap within ECOWAS, the Cocoa RIP should be specifically 
designed to strengthen the capacity of industry support institutions such as the 
Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food (RAAF), the ECOWAP implementation 
agency under the control of the DAEWR. The RAAF could work more closely with the 
two state-owned marketing boards in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire and their counterparts 
in other ECOWAS Member States, allowing them to foster a more competitive and 
more interconnected regional market. 
Given the region’s dependence on foreign reserve earnings, a regional approach to 
macroeconomic management must also be part of a holistic sectoral approach. Recent 
attempts to establish a common regional currency, the ECO, could ease this constraint 
depending on the design of the new currency. However, the introduction of a common 
ECO within ECOWAS including both UEMOA and WAMZ seems unlikely in the near 
future, given heterogeneity in the different economies involved and scepticism among 
some key players such as Nigeria. The recent replacement of the CFA Franc with the 
ECO is more symbolic than functional as the ECO of the UEMOA is still pegged to the 
Euro. A common currency, as already present among the francophone countries under 
UEMOA, can ease foreign reserve constraints for input requirements. However, a 




tariffs for processed cocoa and consumer chocolate and cocoa containing food staff 
are also already in place for UEMOA members, benefitting Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa-
chocolate sector. These should be expanded for the ECOWAS region. 
A well-designed Cocoa RIP would therefore be used to promote market opportunities, 
address challenges (regional and external) and support competitiveness through 
increased investment and capacity development. Efforts from individual countries to 
move into higher value-added segments of the cocoa-chocolate chain would benefit 
from such a regional regulatory framework for the sector, which can tackle various 




Regional integration has been a key policy initiative across the African continent as 
evident from multiple and growing numbers of regional schemes. Yet, most of the 
existing schemes have so far failed to deliver on their objectives of trade creation, 
trade diversification and regional economic integration. Acknowledging the 
conventional argument of design flaws in the institutional arrangements of existing 
regional schemes to explain these failures, we go further and argue that the concept 
of regional integration in itself is inappropriately framed to achieve the objectives 
associated with it in the context of most African economies which suffer from primary 
commodity export dependence and low level of export diversification. We argue that 
in this context, a reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (the prime policy tool 
for regional integration schemes to fulfil their objectives) is unlikely to result in regional 
trade creation and further economic integration. 
We demonstrate this hypothesis focusing on ECOWAS, which has adopted an EU 
inspired linear approach to regional economic integration in which both regulatory and 
institutional frameworks (de jure integration) have been improved over the years to 
advance the integration process and establish an Economic Union. At the same time 
efforts towards an effective formal regional economic integration (de facto integration) 
have been relatively slow. Taking the West African cocoa-chocolate sector as a case 
study we identify three key factors that contribute to the de jure - de facto fallacy of the 
ECOWAS regional integration schemes: Firstly, the governance structure of the global 
cocoa-chocolate value chain which is dominated by few lead firms. Secondly, 
conflicting interests of ECOWAS member states. Thirdly, the region’ heavy reliance 
on foreign reserve earnings for macroeconomic management. None of these hinder 
factors to regional economic integration can be resolved through reduction of barriers 
to trade. 
Based on our analysis, we propose an alternative concept to regional integration that 
is more suitable for economies where the need for structural transformation is 
prevalent and comparative advantages need to be created through strategic regional 
governance. Our alternative approach is based on the concept of regional 




advocates for gradual rather than full-fledged trade liberalisation, through greater state 
intervention to steer productive capacity development and the establishment of 
regional value chains with a view to promoting regional development through 
industrialisation, economic transformation and export diversification. We demonstrate 
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